Historical and Cultural milieu

pdc

Political Discourse

2395-22292582-2691

Prof. R S Yadav

Kurukshetra, Harayana

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RESEARCH ARTICLE

Central Asia Scramble and India's Regional Imperatives

Firdous

Tabasum

¹Dr. Tabasum Firdous, Associate Professor, Center of Central Asian Studies, University of Kashmir

162017

315969

2017

IndianJournals.com

Historical and Cultural milieu

India's relation with Central Asia has a long history. The two regions have shared deep historical and civilizational linkages with each other. At present, the Central Asian region is considered to be the part of India's’ “extended neighborhood. Indo-Central Asian relation is wrapped within two paradigms and posed itself as challenges to the India's emerging relations with respect to Central Asia. Pre-independence type Central Asia but dominated by Soviet Union and post 1990s independent Central Asia plagued with extremism, and terrorism but of opportunities with its rich resources. The pre-independence Soviet dominated Central Asia relations could be conducted through the prism of Indo-Soviet relations that has a history and policy synergy of its own while the post 1990s independent Central Asia relations could be talked about of opportunity and scope for India wanting to boost its ties with the Central Asian nations. Aimed India's energy concerns however, with the Soviet domination gone, extremism, terrorism and internal strife in the region posed greater challenges and further hardened India's ways and means, derailing India's progressive dynamics of regional reach and extra-regional reach.

IPre-independence period

Since the Central Asian states were earlier a part of the Soviet Union, all relations during soviet era could be looked at soviet perspective had two important dimensions; one Indo-soviet friendship that seemed provides a very friendly platform for Indo-Central Asia relations. However, India's options regarding close association with Central Asian nations were limited or indirect (Joshi, p.32, 2008) due to the reason that they were not independent entities or were natural part of Soviet Union at least for India owing to Indo-Soviet friendship and any act or effort to disturb the ‘sphere of influence’ of Soviet Union could have invited soviet wrath ultimately due to the nature of Central Asian nations as satellites. Secondly and most importantly India's friendship paradigm had much prospects for growing Indo-Central Asian relations but due to crisis in India's foreign policy, short sightedness and lack of confidence, Indian policy makers were not in a position to predict an early concern for close relations with central Asia with the result India was not serious for a deep Indo-Central Asia ties. Thus while Central Asia was under soviet control India's prospects for a deep relations remained very slow (Jha Dec, 2016)

As part of imperial Britain, India had developed a kind of enemism with the Tsarist Russia was the first kind of relationship over the politics of geo-political influence in Central and Eurasia(Khan, 1999, pp.128–129). The Anglo-Afghan wars were another kind of relationship that was imposed upon into the relations between India and Afghanistan. Thus in the initial stage India's relations with that of Central Asia were of forced enemism or rivalry due to the imperial politics involved in it, but the post independent era marked with the beginning of friendship and peaceful coexistence-Bundung conference-1955. The negotiations by Imperial Britain to thwart away the Tsarist Russia's sphere of influence to cross Indian frontiers and concluding series of agreements from the ‘storming’ of Tashkent in 1865 to the conclusion of the Pamir Agreement of 1895 (Review, 2010) were markedly the efforts to safeguard the Indian frontiers from the threat coming from the leeward frontiers of Himalaya comprising Central Asia. Despite the prevalent perception among Indians that India is protected and safeguarded by Himalayas and naturally against any outside threat, securing of Indian frontiers has to do with the history of Central Asia should have been prevailed then in the policy making circles. The Hijacking of Airplane in December, 1998 was a specification of that kind of threat that ultimately set/signaled the alarm bell of concern. The ‘Great Game’ that began in early 19th century over the resources and strategic position of controlling of most importantly ‘heartland’ including Indian subcontinent was actually a contest for ‘control over and pull-over’ of the two giant imperial powers- the Tsarist Russia and the great Britain (control over means that Tsarist Russia wanted to increase its sphere of influence to control warm waters of Indian subcontinent and pull-over was the Britain efforts to pull back any effort by the tsarist Russia)-that had to do with the transcendence of geopolitics of the region (Review, 2010).

India's Regional Imperatives: Pakistan, China and Russia: The Evolution of Regional conflict

The US Deputy Secretary of state Strobe Talbott in July, 1997 while talking about the urgency of reforms in the nations of the Caucasus and Central Asia cautioned, ignoring the region or failure of reforms in the strategically vital region that borders China, Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan will simmer into cross-border conflicts, breeding ground of terrorism-a hot bed of religious and political extremism and a battle-ground for outright war. Central Asia has been an arena of “great game”(). External players interested in the region like Russia, China, US, Turkey, Iran, Europe, EU, Japan, Pakistan, India, Afghanistan have all substantial security and economic interests in the region. That has been wrought out as a revival of great game in Central Asia. To maximize their geo-political advantage, ensure safety of their national interests, external players have maximized their efforts to engage with Central Asia with all their wits and vessels. In turn Central Asia also needs the help of external players especially the US, Russia, China and other regional ones to fasten their economic development and strengthen their state apparatus. Building connectivity to global markets, reviving the ancient Silk Route with the help of China, the Kazakh-China (August 2012) gas pipeline connectivity project and using Old Russian connection and building new ones are all part of facilitating Central Asia's connectivity with rest of the world (Das, Oct, 2012).

In this connection Central Asia may look for advantages of nation building even if it may involve annoying regional countries like Russia, who believe Central Asia as its own sphere of influence or near abroad, or even China which is investing huge, while inviting the US into the region that may further add up to conflict. South Asian politics also add up certain anomalies for Central Asia. The Indo-Pak rivalry over Afghanistan for strategic gain has extended to Central Asia. Pakistan has its own policy maneuverings to keep India out of Central Asia. This has to do with strategic balancing of the region to their advantage. Both the countries, however, have followed policy of out-doing each other in order to gain strategic advantage and use it against the other. In this direction India has its plan to find a niche in the region to accelerate its own development and overcome energy crisis that it faces. This has given rise to extension of conflict geographically and qualitatively. Geographically extending to South Asian region by involving Pakistan, India and China. Qualitatively making conflict explosive and nuclear by involving nuclear flash point countries-India-Pakistan near-region wise and US-alliance vs Russia-China block wise. These are however, hindrances to India's successful regional reach policy or extended regional reach policy.

Collapse of Soviet Union with independence to Central Asia states naturally removed India's obstacles. However, in the conduct of its relations with Central Asia India was confronted with new challenges and prospects that pulled down Indo-Central Asian relations into geo-political confrontations and bickering owing to role played by other regional players like Pakistan maneuverings, putting India's case for regional dominance/leadership onto further test. This changing Central Asian politics from soviet dominance politics to politics of extremism, terrorism, internal strife of ethnicity, boundary dispute etc. also changed India's foreign policy options and initiatives. Apart from acting into a Nehru's line of peaceful ‘co-existence’ and ‘panchsheela’ (cooperative mechanism) India's responses were merely of counter-moves or of retaliation (in order to outdo each other) in nature that so against acts by Pakistan. Thus while India could have afforded a well planned scheme for indo-Central Asian relations owing to its great history of peaceful coexistence and rules of panchsheela, the result was India's principled foreign policy position received a setback.

Indo-Pak Rivalry over Central Asia

Pakistan's advantage as a transit between India and Central Asia in the regions’ reach has further occupied India's Pakistan imagination and hardened India's Central Asia policy. For Pakistan, any Indian intervention in the region, beginning with Afghanistan, poses a real and catastrophically dangerous threat to its existence. India enjoys due recognition in Central Asia especially after its efforts in Afghanistan in its pro-active regional policy, however, such a policy-move is seen by Pakistan containing dangerous designs of ‘encirclement’ (encirclement of Pakistan) (Christopher L., pp. 15–16, 2011). India's soft power approach of reconstruction and re-building helping to enhance democratic profile in Central Asia and the challenges it faces in that endeavor signifies it's prospective in Central Asia. Pakistan maneuvers to keep Indian entry in to Central Asia blocked. It used discursive formula of ‘good Taliban and bad Taliban’ a strategic tool to bring the Taliban in to the power domain of Afghanistan to benefit it (Pakistan) at least to counter India. The Indian diplomatic debacle at the London of January, 2010, where Indian concerns were summarily ignored is an example. The conference was a major breakthrough where Pakistan convinced the West that it can play the role of mediator in negotiations with (good) Taliban (Harsh V. Pant, 2011). This reportedly forced a major rethink of New Delhi's Afghan-Pak policy. Such a paradoxical situation having conflictual character may hold Central Asia as hostage in the geo-strategic fight between two South Asian nuclear powers. Seen in the prospective of conflict (theory of conflict) the bilateral rivalry between the two may escalate further engulfing Central Asia deep inside owing to the growing importance of the region, and in the event of both trying to get a strategic deal with the Central Asian countries aimed to reduce the influence one or the other. Pakistan's policy to deny any transit access, overland or otherwise, for Indian freights to Central Asia has made India to look for other options. To overcome such hurdles Indian efforts ended up with opening of many alternate routes that ultimately resulted in an increased India's connect towards the region. The establishment of The North South Transport Corridor (NSTC) that link India with Central Asia made possible to bypasses its transit dependence on Pakistan. Moreover, to overcome such hurdles, the construction, with India's assistance, of the Iranian port of Chahbahar connecting with Zaranj–Delaram Roadway (ZDR) in Nimroz Province will serve as India's gateway to central Asia. India has another alternate sea-to-land route option available running through the Iranian port of Bandar Anzali on the Caspian coast to gain access to the CARs and Russia. Such a project will also boost India's commercial trade ties with Russia and the Russian goods and minerals and agricultural produce will be available in Indian markets hassle-free. That will ultimately help realize New Delhi's goal to expand its strategic reach northwards (expansion of its northwards) (Das, Oct, 2012).

India and China over Central Asia: China's Infrastructure cooperation and economic penetration: A policy.

Growing Chinese foothold into Central Asian countries has further added to India's’ concern. Constructive programme of “building roads, railways and pipelines across the CAR” (According to Parag Khanna) countries that has made transportation of number of goods possible to China, like Siberian timber, Mongolian iron ore, Kazakh oil, Turkmen gas and Afghan copper, through an East-bound network have introduced China impact factor into economic profile of Central Asia that is impossible to ignore while construing for a vibrant penetration into Central Asia region. This China impact factor is all part of China's efforts in the field of Oil pipelines (from the Caspian Sea across Kazakhstan) gas pipelines (from Turkmenistan) and other planned roads and railways across Russia down to the Pakistani port of Gwadar wanting “to turn the region into a transit hub between the East and West”. China's coherent Central Asia strategy which became more forceful in the wake of China's deepening engagement with Afghanistan, the deepening Russo-Pak ties and since the conduct of joint military exercises has brought before India a challenge of China-Russia-Pak arc, notwithstanding Russia's ‘sphere of influence’ more coherently since its (Russia's) promotion of the Eurasian Project (Das, Oct, 2012).

Thus China forms very important part of Central Asia's connectivity project. The deepening China-Central Asia engagement is essentially a strategic policy approach to link Central Asia with China's western regions. One of the important features of China's policy towards Central Asia is “infrastructure cooperation and ‘economic penetration”. This “infrastructure cooperation “is an efforts to revive the ancient Silk Route, offer of $ 10 billion grant and aid, construction of China-Central Asia Gas Pipeline Project (1st August 2012). It has used SCO as platform to forward its multi-lateral relations while conducting bi-lateral relations with all Central Asian countries successfully. This has made for China possible to use Central Asia's vast mineral resources to further its economic development. China big invest in central Asia has also to do away with the threat of “separatism, extremism and terrorism” arising out of Central Asian territories” (IDSA-Report; Oct, 2013).

India and Russia over Central Asia: Central Asia is Russia's near abroad.

Russia, India's time tested strategic partner, has instilled in India a major concern over growing close Russia-China partnership turning into military cooperation that can pose a very serious challenge to India's growing regional profile. Thus while Russia remained very concerned to India's security, ensuring more advanced and efficient military technology to India, a recent deal Russia selling China SU-35s and S 400 air defense to China may involve risking Indian security. Another problem that this Russia-China cooperation has indicated may inherit Russia-Pak rapprochement. Although Russia had to cut the deal offer of Mi-35 Hind E heavy attack helicopters to Pakistan, and delay joint Russian-Pak military exercises-2016, due to India pressure, the China-Russia platform has provided a much space to invigorate Pakistan into Russia-China friendship. Thus a Russia-China-Pakistan triangle could mean India's complete geostrategic encirclement. Moreover, such triangle may turn more lethal aimed India's leaning towards the US (Report Jul, 2015 ORF).

Russia regards CARs near abroad. It has floated a number of institutions including the CSTO, EURASEC etc. to maintain and further develop its ties with the Central Asian countries. It also hosts a large number of economic migrants from Central Asia. Russia provides the established outlet to the Central Asian countries. Central Asian gas exports, for instance, to Europe are through Russian network of oil & gas pipelines. Central Asian countries fall squarely within the Russian security parameter. However, the relationship between CARs and Russia is not smooth. The CARs are also looking for diversification of their ties. As a result, their engagements with China, the US and NATO have grown in the recent years. Within the SCO framework, China and Russia have carried out a number of anti-terror military exercises starting from 2001. Russia has been taking steps to build new pipelines to preserve its markets in European countries. The Central Asia gas pipeline is the main pipeline carrying gas from CAR to Russia. The Russian project of oil-gas pipeline involving Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Azarbaijan has been seen by the US as occupy instincts towards European Markets with US and the West promoting their project “Multiple pipeline policy”. “The west has thus invested in Baku-Ceyhan pipeline to reduce its dependence on Russia”(Majeed, 23, 2008).

Transcendence of Geopolitics over Central AsiaInternational Imperatives: Conflict within Cooperation-US, India, Russia and China

Overseas player such as US has emerged as major contender that has reshaped or intensified the geo-political and geo-strategic wrangling over the region. It has used organizational platforms such as NATO to extend its influence into Central Asia. Offering other initiatives such the Partnership for Peace (PFP) programme has further heightened the stakes of power politics in Central Asia. Advocating their aim to strengthen democratic institutions and economic reforms, US policy, may be welcome in Central Asia but any effort to disturb the regional configuration that may disturb Russia and China may further heighten the chance of instability. With some regional actors (like Turkey, Iran, and Russia etc) and Asian giants Japan US designs to expand influence and cut the others will eventually determine the nature of scramble for control of the region aptly redefined as New Great Game. Washington and Iran sees India's role as-extended neighborhood very friendly and important for tightening screws of Central Asia stability. Turkey, however, a pliant of US, with more ethno-cultural-geographic proximity finds more penetration in to the region for initiating Turkey model of democracy and development due to US backing(Alexei: 1994). While US has taken on board India as an important partner fighting terrorism, fundamentalism and extremism, it has been seen, even within India, a plank by the US to counter China (The Hindu, Nov, 2005). U.S. presence in Afghanistan formed the piller of its influence in the region; however, such influence is still absent elsewhere in Central Asia. The lack of a framework for integrating Central Asia into the international community, such as NATO or else, through which the United States can promote its interests, is a constraint on the U.S. ability to maintain its own influence and counter Russia as well as China. In the absence of such a framework, Washington is limited to pursuing bilateral relationships with individual countries, which are in turn limited by the degree to which they are willing to adapt to U.S. policy priorities. This further limits U.S. leverage in the region (Rumer, Summer 2006, pp. 141–154).

The new initiative under P.M. Modi to diversify its foreign relations orientations (policy) with a strong and rejuvenating friendship, most importantly US-India relationship, has enhanced India's profile (and security value) however, may inchoate its Central Asia strategy owing to how Russia and China view US strategy in region. Both Russia and China being major contenders of the region any (Indian) initiative to succeed in Central Asia with forming Indo-US axis therefore must not discomfort Russia and China or to take an example the case of ‘ConocoPhillip’ between Beijeing and India. Although the Central Asian countries find more edge towards the US being the Overseas power in the region and fully aware of the importance of Russia, and of China also now, in the region the nature of its influence in the region reduces further to the extent that it can hardly ignore the both regional players in its policy towards Central Asia. In this connection India's new approach of integrating its foreign relations/policy with Indo-US profile must not be too much emphasized at the altar of relations with others (Tanchum, April, 2015).

Russia and China has cooperated with the US and willingly accepted the US presence in Central Asia on the issue of fighting terrorism and extremism, instead of balancing the US in the region. That has led to cooperation in time of conflict between Russia and US and China and US who have become major contenders of the new great game in Central Asia. But such cooperation is temporary due to perpetual nature of conflict in the light of (national) interests clash.

One would find a cooperative mechanism developing within the confrontational politics. For example the Moscow and Beijing coordination’, which has led to convergence of engagement, on several issues most explicit on a platform such as the UN which represents a Unipolar world dominated by west led by the US. Such a coordination or convergence has been further strengthened by the establishment RIC, SCO, and BRICS help them to acknowledge the world as multi-polar in which they will have active role (Tang, Asian Survey-Apr., 2000). While the bigger fratricidal tussle remains there, between the US dominated unipolar world and supporters of multipolar world, countries like Russia and China coordination has given rise to convergence of engagement. Thus Russia and China have developed a common platform against the US within the conflictual or confrontational international politics of dominance. There is another factor which forces the countries for a mutual coordination/cooperation that is ‘fear’ that acts as deterrence. Such a ‘convergence of engagement’ necessitated due to the feeling by both Russia and China; ‘China fears’ considering Russia's nuclear weapons superiority, ‘Russia fears’ fully knowing its limits before China's conventional military might. However, the most important element that has made cooperation possible leading to convergence of engagement is the fears, of both, being encircled and isolated, if either of the one (China or Russia) joins the West block (Unnikrishnan, & Uma, Jul, 2015). Thus mutuality of fear has limited the scope for confrontational politics and brought to realization in both Moscow and Beijing for a better coordination and cooperation together through a web of military, economic, energy, and social ties that may turn to convergence of engagement into convergence of interests. Apart from confronting a common enemy in international arena-the US dominancy fears, (of being encircled) Russia's China fear and China's Russia fears-has a tendency of risk and suspicion. Moreover, the deterrence of fear or fear (of each other) has a dual utility, situational character, of either igniting confrontation or conflict also. While the nations find a mutual platform for coordination, such type of cooperation is temporary due to risks of suspicion involved in it. Therefore in cooperative mechanism out of necessity gave rise to confrontation as well like the example of Alliance of US and Russia in World war-II. (ORF, March, 2013, Report,)

Therefore theories of conflict sometimes do suggest mutual cooperation or coordination in times of necessity that are purely situational. Thus scramble for Central Asia has led to convergence between two contenders of Central Asia. Since the US (and the allies) is a common enemy and an intruder into the regional dynamics of Russia's sphere of influence or near aboard and China's economic corridor has led to both cooperate (Tang, Asian Survey-Apr., 2000) in the confrontational order. Russia and China while having some common interests developed to work but the region (Central Asia) that lie at the strategic junction between the two countries may incur tensions between the two. Mr Arkhipov described this Russia-China cooperation temporary (India-Russia needs to think strategically, Report by ORF). China’ infrastructure investment and connectivity politics to open Central Asia for its market seems uneasy or uncomfortable to Russia. Russia had ‘accused China of “quietly conquering” the Russian Far East’. (Tang, Asian Survey-Apr., 2000)

While both the countries (in a joint statement in 2010), have recognized each other's concerns; China recognizing post-Soviet region as Russia's special domain and support for Russia's endeavors in the region still the ambiguous/anomalies in the relations remain there that find expressions in the clash of interest in Central Asia. Beijing and Moscow have begun collaborating due to mutuality of fear, threat, there remains to be “China threat” a dominant factor in Russia's foreign and defence policies whereas ‘Russia threat’ happens to be a response variable for China in the eventuality of developing any conflict. In this manner Russian military plans of developing Eastern Military District-supplying it with new weapons and troops, and conducting military exercises, redeploying troops to the Russian Far East exacerbates to similar moves by the counterpart-China inviting similar fear or threat: for example the Chinese military conducts exercises simulating an invasion of Russia with its troops marching 1,000 kilometers to test the army's long-range projection capacity (Unnikrishnan, & Uma, Jul, 2015).

Inferences

Sino-Russian relations in the post-cold war era have grown into a tactical pragmatism (Unnikrishnan, & Uma, Jul, 2015) shown by each of them that has led both, China and Russia, by developing mutuality of interests to balance the US. As long as such types of shared interest or common grounds for coordination to balance the US remain there, China-Russia partnership will see further strength.

The rupture of the relationship over a conflict of interest in Central Asia is a real possibility that would spell disaster for the region and beyond.

This obviously has implications and India must consider whether these developments are desirable or not. The question that concerns India is that any external influence in CARs will have serious implications, direct or indirect for the countries of the region.

However, the intense conflict may open up options of cooperation owing to human understanding of war.

Implications for India

In the event of close Sino-Russian rapprochement and deep strategic partnership India's options will be constrained in Central Asia keeping deep China-Pak friendship in mind, and newly emerging Pak-Russia strategic partnership.

India's diversification of its foreign relations especially drawing closer to US, may further constrain India's options in Central Asia keeping in view the profile of US in the eyes of China and Russia. Such a diversification has also a tendency to draw Russia out of India's friendship orbit and close to Pakistan, in view of Pak-China friendship that can be used to draw an arc of Russia-China-Pak.

America sees India as an important player in Central Asia due to its role in Afghanistan. The Indo-US collaboration in various fields, recently strategic partnership and defense, may find expression in an effort of India to balance Russia and China in the region. Such a prospect of balancing Russia and China by drawing US-India axis is dangerous at least for India due to the fact that the balance of power gives rise to conflict or war-break down of balance means war. Russia and China coordination on forums like UN, and BRICS, SCO, and RIC and their cooperation in Central Asia may also provide difficulties for any

other contender in the region, especially which closer to US.

“If Russia starts supplying high technology to China in the military sphere, India's security could be compromised. There is also the possibility of Russia growing closer to Pakistan because of China's influence” (Unnikrishnan, & Uma, Jul, 2015).

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