Introduction

pdc

Political Discourse

2395-22292582-2691

Prof. R S Yadav

Kurukshetra, Harayana

pdc-1-2-002

RESEARCH ARTICLE

US-Pakistan Relations Since 9/11: A Paradox of Third Alliance Partnership

Singh

Baljit

¹Prof. Baljit Singh, Department of Political Science, University of Jammu, Jammu-180006

1122015

121935

2015

IndianJournals.com

Introduction

Since the inception of Pakistan as a state in the community of nations, the United States has always remained an important component in its foreign policy calculations. Though, Pakistan has enjoyed good equation with United States, yet at times, their bilateral relations have witnessed various ups and downs. They have already experienced three alliance partnerships in their bilateral relations, which were shaped by the then prevailing conditions. Almost all the three alliance partnerships have given the status of most allied ally to Pakistan. These partnerships were shaped by the short term convergence of interests between Washington and Islamabad. Partnership, entered into 1950s, late 1970s and in 2001, Pakistan and United States served their immediate national interests. Obvious motives behind Pakistan's three partnerships with US were to mobilize latter's support on Kashmir issue, to get military & economic aid, from US and to ensure its security and parity vis-à-vis India. Broad motive of US to have alliance partnership with Pakistan in 1950s and in late 1970s era to contain growing influence of erstwhile USSR and thereby communism in South Asia, and to fight with Soviet forces and Soviet supported regime in Afghanistan respectively. Third US alliance partnership with Pakistan was driven by its goal to fight terrorism in general and Al Qaeda in particular that was responsible for September 11, 2001 attacks on symbols of US military (Pentagon), economic (World Trade Centre) and political might (Capital Hill). This alliance partnership has remained unique in multiple ways as compared to the first and second.

9/11 happenings were followed by the US GWOT and the epicenter of this war was Afghanistan. This development changed the security scenario for Pakistan not only because Afghanistan was its next door neighbour but also due to reversal in its Afghan policy. Since US war on terror was targeted against Al Qaeda and its leader Osama bin Laden and Taliban regime in Afghanistan, which was providing shelter to both. Therefore, the regime change in Kabul was first and foremost objective of US war on terror. Moreover, Taliban regime was installed with active support of Islamabad and the latter was enjoying considerable influence with Kabul. In its war on terror, the US required the support of Pakistan due to three reasons: first, because of its physical proximity with Afghanistan; and second, because it was enjoying leverage with Taliban; because Pakistan has remained vital route for supply to ISAF/US forces in Afghanistan. Third, Pakistan being a Muslim state as a part of US war on terror was the necessity to ensure that US war on terror is not against Islam. This is how the geo-strategy of US war on terror became Pakistan centric.

Pakistan was provided with a close ended option “either you are with us or them” by Bush Administration. President Musharraf admitted in his book titled, In the Line of Fire: A Memoir published in 2006 that Pakistan was coerced into third alliance partnership. He further argued that Pakistan was threatened either to join war with US and its allies against Al Qaeda and Taliban in Afghanistan or be ready to face the consequences.¹ The US secured Pakistan's support to war on terror by threatening its military ruler Pervez Musharraf that if Pakistan fails to comply then it would be “bombed back to the Stone Age”. This message was conveyed to Pakistan though the then US Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage. However, in the mainstream literature on US-Pakistan relations, it is argued that US war on terror in Afghanistan provided challenge as well as opportunity to Pakistan in general and Musharraf regime in particular to stabilize economic situation at home by getting economic and military aid from US and also to normalize relations with US that reached at the lowest ebb because of the sanctions imposed against Pakistan due of its nuclear program (1998) and military coup of October 1999. In US strategy regarding its war on terror, Pakistan was made the frontline state because US thought the collaboration with Pakistan is vital to marginalize the support for Taliban. As Pakistan joined US war on terror in Afghanistan, it changed the domestic as well as external environment of Pakistan's foreign policy including its relations with the sole super power. During the last one decade (2001–2011), US-Pakistan relations have witnessed various ups and downs. For instance, the Bush Administration had expressed confidence in Pakistan and provided military and economic aid without accountability. But keeping in view the criticism of aid US provides to Pakistan, Obama Administration has attempted to link aid with accountability. Recently, it has been observed that neither United States nor Pakistan is happy with the current alliance partnership. After the killing of Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad in Pakistan on May 2, 2011 by the US Navy Seals, the law makers in US are raising the fundamental questions over the credibility of Pakistan as a partner in US war on terror in Af-Pak region. It has further jeopardized the prospects of the continuity of military and economic aid. The Obama Administration's announcement earlier in August 2011 that it planned to withhold $800 million aid to Pakistan sends a signal that the current state of affairs between the two countries is no longer sustainable.² Pakistan is also frustrated with this third alliance partnership. Its resentment is clearly demonstrated with the growth of anti-American sentiment in its society. Pakistan is unhappy with the United States not only because of the increasing public resentment against Americans but also because its army is not happy with US/NATO drone strikes in Pakistan's territory. The drone strikes of November 26, 2011 forced Pakistan not only to cut the supply line to ISAF/NATO forces through its territory but also asked US to vacate its Shamsi air base. Moreover, both the civilian and praetorian leadership has given free hand to army to retaliate such attacks in future without waiting for orders from the high command. Such a scenario of uncertainty and distrust prevailing in US- Pakistan relations has raised a series of questions. Why Pakistan entered into the third alliance partnership, even though, its experience of first and second alliance partnerships with US was not good? How come this alliance partnership was different from the earlier ones? Is it a durable partnership? What has been remained the impact of third alliance partnership on the domestic politics of Pakistan? In which direction the US-Pakistan relations are moving in the light of the recent developments in Af-Pak region. Why both partners are unhappy from their current alliance partnership? Are they going to break or reshape their partnership? In this paper an attempt has made to probe these and related questions.

Evolving Third Alliance Partnership

Third US-Pakistan partnership has been shaped by the 9/11 happenings which were followed by US war on terror. Afghanistan has remained the epicenter of terrorism and theatre of GWOT. Pakistan because of its geographic proximity with Afghanistan and the leverage that it enjoyed with Taliban regime in latter, had become a critical state for US. Before 9/11 happenings US-Pakistan relations were at the lowest ebb as the latter was suffering from the dual sanctions imposed by the former. The US sanctions under the Symington and Glenn Amendments were imposed against the nuclear program of Pakistan that ultimately culminated into nuclear tests of May 1998. These nuclear proliferation induced sanctions were followed by the pro-democracy sanctions when General Pervez Musharraf dismissed Nawaz Sharif government and staged military coup. 9/11 changed the context for domestic and external politics of Pakistan. When US articulated its policy response to 9/11 happenings, Pakistan figured prominently. Pakistan was provided with a close ended option in which it was given choice between the terrorists and US. Although, it was Pakistan which introduced the phenomenon of Taliban and terrorism in the politics of Afghanistan but the US selected Islamabad as a frontline partner in its war against terror. General Musharraf until then was backing Afghanistan's Taliban government, headed by Mullah Omar, to the hilt, justified the U-turn in its policy by telling his generally anti-American people that if he had not done so, Pakistan's “strategic assets”, the customary euphemism for nuclear arsenal, would have been endangered.³ Why US preferred Pakistan vis-à-vis India as a collaborator in its war on terror in Afghanistan, whereas both (India & United States) were the victims of terrorism, but Pakistan was using the terrorism as an instrument of its policy. India also offered to collaborate in US war on terror but US preferred Pakistan because of three reasons. First, Pakistan has been having direct physical access to Afghanistan; however, India lacks direct physical connection with Afghanistan. Second, the US had already experienced two alliance partnerships with Pakistan and thereby was having more confidence in Pakistan than India because it has always remained easy for US to mould Pakistan according to its requirements, whereas that was not true in case of India. Third, Pakistan's collaboration in US war on terror was utmost necessity to give message to the Muslim world in particular and the international community in general that its war on terror is not a war against Islam rather, it is a war against terrorism, which was a threat to world peace.

What Pakistan has gained out of this third partnership? First and foremost, Pakistan saved herself from becoming the target of US GWOT. Pakistan installed friendly Taliban regime in Afghanistan since 1996 and the Taliban regime was providing shelter to Al Qaeda and its leader Osama bin Laden, therefore, there was realization in US that Pakistan implicitly is part of the problem. There was a clear message from US to Pakistan that either cooperate in US war on terror or be ready for consequences. In such a situation, Pakistan was not having much option but to cooperate. This is how, Pakistan saved itself from becoming the target of US, however in the process, it has become the target of terrorism and terrorists like Al Qaeda. Second gain of Pakistan's partnership with US since 9/11 was that latter lifted pro-democracy and nuclear proliferation induced sanctions against the former. Third, as Pakistan's economy was in bad shape, its third partnership with US provided it with an economic opportunity. This aid package was a major economic relief for Musharraf regime. Fourth, in June 2004, Bush Administration designated Pakistan as a Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) of the US under Section 517 of the Foreign Assistance Act 1961. The MNNA status entails two benefits to Pakistan: first closer military to military ties and second access to American defence equipment. In 2005, Bush Administration cleared the sale of F-16 aircrafts to Pakistan. Fifth, the US did not put pressure on the praetorian regime of General Musharraf to democratize itself. This concession stabilized Musharraf's position in the domestic politics of Pakistan.

Initially, Pakistan might be coerced into the third alliance partnership designed by the US, to fight GWOT but subsequently, Pakistan also developed stakes in it because terrorism emerged as a threat not only to the US but to Pakistan as well. Radicalization of society was a major threat to state in Pakistan, which it had faced in 1990s and in the beginning of 21st century. The US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and law enforcement agents collaborate with the Pakistani authorities in flushing out Al Qaeda and Taliban remnants throughout Pakistan. In October 2002, Islamabad claimed to have captured and remanded to US custody, some 422 Al Qaeda operatives.⁴ The US and Pakistan revived or initiated several organizational mechanisms to plan their security cooperation. General Musharraf moved quickly to strengthen the largely dysfunctional Anti-Terrorism Courts, institutions that had been introduced by the predecessor civilian regime of Nawaz Sharif. He also banned several militant, sectarian and Kashmir jihadi groups, arrested many of their members, and disrupted their financial bases.⁵ In December 2003, two unsuccessful assassination attempts were made on General Musharraf-when he was travelling from Rawalpindi to Islamabad. In February 2004 Pakistan's South Waziristan Operation was highly controversial in which its military and para-military forces fought a small-scale yet bloody war against tribal lashkars mostly from the Mahsud tribe in the Pushto-speaking Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) of Waziristan. The purpose of aforesaid operation was to root out, capture and kill remnants of the Taliban and foreign mercenaries who had allegedly found shelter in the forbidding terrain of the region.⁶ This operation not only resulted into criticism of Musharraf's domestic and foreign policies but also fueled anti-American sentiment in Pakistan. With the help of army, Musharraf was able to keep protest against the US campaign within bounds.

Change in US Strategy and Its Fallout

In order to achieve better results on ground of its war on terror, the United States started using drone strikes against Al Qaeda operatives initially in Afghanistan and subsequently in Pakistan. From June 2004 to January 2009, the Bush Administration authorized 44 strikes in the rugged northwestern region of Pakistan. During initial two years of its term, the Obama Administration authorized nearly four times as many drone strikes as did the Bush Administration throughout its tenure.⁷ Frequency of drone strikes increased under the leadership of President Obama because he wanted to finish the job at the earliest. From June 2004 to April 2011, drone strikes killed somewhere between 1435 and 2283 people, of whom between 1145 and 1822 were described as militants in reliable press accounts.⁸ Increasing frequency of drone strikes has further strengthened anti- American element as- it was considered as the violation of territoriality and sovereignty of Pakistan. However, political elite and army criticized these strikes but in the past Pakistan supported US drone attacks on its territory. Pakistan had reasons to cooperate because these strikes killed its enemies such as Mehsud, who targeted police officers, soldiers, and civilians across the country with suicide bombings.⁹ Behind the scenes, the ruling elite of Pakistan including President Asif Ali Zardari and Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani supported the drone strikes, despite their occasional public protests. In a State Department cable from August 2008, just when Washington was ramping up the drone program, Gilani stated: I don't care if they (the Americans) do it as long as they get the right people. We will protest in the National Assembly and then ignore it.¹⁰

In April 2011 Zardari articulated that he would like the Obama Administration to share drone technology with his country so that future strikes could happen under a Pakistani flag. Washington took some small steps in this direction, offering to send a dozen Shadow and 85 Raven drones to Pakistan for surveillance purposes.¹¹ Pakistan had assisted the United States and its allies in a variety of ways, offering its bases for reconnaissance and rescue operations, logistic support to the American troops operating in Afghanistan, intelligence resources, and airspace for strikes against the Taliban and Al Qaeda targets.¹²

Despite all that, why Pakistan all of a sudden has changed its attitude towards US and its GWOT in Afghanistan recently? The various explanations are given in this regard. First, Obama Administration's Af-Pak policy in 2009 in which US clearly stated that Pakistan is the part of Afghanistan problem, which Pakistan does not like because of its far reaching implications. Bush Administration was also aware in this regard but did not say it openly because of its negative impact on the US-Pakistan relations. When the 9/11 Commission Report suggested Pakistan as a state sponsor of terrorism, then Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright had opposed it, saying it would destroy US influence in Islamabad.¹³ Pakistan reacted sharply against the use of the term Af-Pak, coined by Obama's special envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Richard Holbrooke. Af-Pak intends to treat the two neighbouing Muslim states as a single theater of operations but Pakistan's criticism forced the Obama Administration to withdraw the term from diplomatic parlance from January 2010.¹⁴ Notwithstanding the withdrawal of the term Af- Pak, the US has been continuing with its understanding that Pakistan is the part of Afghan problem and it can also be the part of solution. This has resulted into the increase of drone strikes against Taliban and Al Qaeda elements operating from Pakistan's territory. Second, after the killing of Osama bin Laden (OBL) in a drone strikes on May 2, 2011, Pakistan has faced severe domestic criticism regarding the violation of its sovereignty and territoriality by the US. The US- Pak relations got further deteriorated because Pakistan was not taken into confidence regarding the drone attacks carried out against Laden on its territory. Why US did not take Pakistan into confidence regarding the aforesaid operations? However, US has been fighting its GWOT with the help of Pakistan as a frontline state but during the course of this war in Afghanistan US has lost confidence in Pakistan because of latter's duplicity. And US did not want to miss the target this time that is why it neither shared the information nor did it take Pakistan into confidence regarding the drone strikes which killed Osama bin Laden. Pakistan was facing the criticism at home on OBL issue on the one hand and after the killing of Laden, the US also started building pressure on Pakistan to do more in war on terror because Pakistan was held responsible for hiding Osama Bin Laden. In order to counter this criticism, Prime Minister Syed Yusuf Raza Gilani threw back the “do more” phrase at the US. He pointed out that Pakistan had done a lot in the war on terror and it was now the turn of the US to make sacrifices.¹⁵ Third, the action against the Haqqani Network (HN) has become a major bone of contention between the US and Pakistan. Former is putting pressure on the latter to act against the HN which is based in North Waziristan of Pakistan and has been fighting against the NATO/ISAF/US forces in Afghanistan. According to the United States, the HN is responsible for September 13, 2011 attack on its Embassy in Kabul, killing of former Afghanistan President Burhanuddin Rabbani on September 20, 2011 and the July 2008 attack on the Indian Embassy in Kabul was also traced to the HN. Because of the pressure of HN, the western efforts to engage purported moderates in the Taliban have gone waste. Now the US is preparing to scale down its presence in Afghanistan, it needs Pakistan to act against the Haqqanis more than ever.¹⁶ Recently US official stated that the HN is veritable arm of Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence but the Pakistan's leadership stated that the HN is not the creation of Pakistan but of the US during its anti- Soviet operation in Afghanistan in 1980s. Although both are blaming each other but the HN was their joint product in their fight against the Soviet forces in Afghanistan. In its GWOT, the US has discovered the HN, one of its enemies after Al Qaeda and Taliban. The US regards the HN as a major threat to the US and coalition forces in Afghanistan, whereas, Pakistan wants to use the HN as a strategic asset in Afghanistan after the withdrawal of the US/NATO forces from there in 2014. The Haqqani group's attack on US-NATO interests in Afghanistan had made mending US-Pak relations extremely difficult. It appears that Islamabad may soon have to choose between Haqqani and the US.¹⁷ Islamabad's stated contention is that the HN has never targeted Pakistan and so it would rather not open another front. Besides this, Islamabad's fear is that the US by wanting to eliminate the HN is actually trying to elbow Pakistan out of the negotiations to decide on the governance equation in Kabul after 2014.¹⁸ Fourth, the increasing drone strikes in its tribal belt has resulted not only into a large number of civilian casualties but also fuelled resentment against United States and Pakistan because it has eroded their autonomy. In Pakistan, the government's decision to support the US in sharp deviation of its Afghan policy created violence and political agitation, particularly in the tribal areas in the north of the country and in Balochistan.¹⁹ When Pakistan collaborated in US war on terror in Afghanistan, apart from the aid and other concessions, Pakistan also expected that the political price for its collaboration with the US-led coalition would not only be a ‘friendly government of its crafting in Kabul’ but also a massive pressure on India to accommodate Pakistan on Kashmir.²⁰ Instead of getting that political benefit on the aforesaid issues out of third alliance partnership with United States, Pakistan has paid a heavy political price in its tribal areas, for supporting US war in Afghanistan. Fifth, the current US-Pakistan alliance partnership was driven in the short term by a single dimension which glossed over many of the divergences between the two nations. Even in the counter-terrorism campaign, Washington and Islamabad have different and sometimes conflicting goals.²¹ Developments in their bilateral relations indicate that the divergence of interests between the United States and the establishment in Pakistan has emerged on the scene that deteriorated their equation.

Frontline State to a Problematic State

Why Pakistan adopted dual approach on GWOT in Afghanistan? Pakistan adopted duplicity to keep US in good humour on the one hand and to protect Taliban on the other- as this was required by immediate and ultimate interests of its foreign policy respectively. Explicitly Pakistan along with US was fighting against Taliban in Afghanistan but implicitly, it was providing shelter to Taliban in its own Tribal belt. Pakistan did not whole-heartedly cooperate with US in war on terror in Afghanistan because of these reasons. First, Pakistan in pursuit her policy of strategic depth towards Afghanistan wanted to retain some sort of relationship with Taliban. It fought with US in Afghanistan which resulted into the overthrow of Taliban regime in Afghanistan but in order to continue its leverage with Taliban, it provided shelter to them. Second, Pakistan has been reluctant in fully cooperating as a hammer to the American anvil to break the back of the insurgency. It wants to retain some leverage via Afghan Taliban factions not only for future Afghan outcomes but also in ensuring that Pakistan's 27 million Pashtuns do not create blowback for the Pakistani state. It has Pakistan's Pashtun problem that has been the principal driver for its strategic depth policy. Third, Pakistan state has not demonstrated sovereign governance capabilities to “hold and build” western Pakistan.²² Fourth, Pakistan state is not prepared to dismantle its reliance on radical Islam because that requires Pakistan to ideologically reinvent itself as a normal state.

Generally, it is argued that Pakistan while joining the US war on terror after 9/11 happenings, took u-turn in its Afghanistan policy. But the critical question arises here is that was it really a u-turn? Recent happenings in Pakistan substantiate the argument that Pakistan embarked on the policy of duplicity right from the beginning. This policy of duplicity can best be described as one of hunting with the American hound and running with the Jihadi hare. The US was by no means unaware of what was going on, but the surprise is that it was content to remonstrate with General Musharraf privately and hailing him as a “key ally” publicly.²³ After the testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee of Defence Secretary, Leon Panetta and the former Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen, the United States has realized that the HN is a “veritable arm of Pakistan's Inter- Services Intelligence” and the HN based in North Waziristan in Pakistan's tribal lands, as the “foremost threat to the US coalition forces in Afghanistan”. A necessary corollary of this is that the US, having tolerated Pakistan's duplicity for long years, is now fed up because its own personnel and interests are under attack. Pakistan's reaction in this regard has been one of denial and defiance.²⁴ Mike Mullen-who was the sharpest critic of Pakistan from the American side-made it clear in his damning testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee of Afghanistan and Iraq that disengaging with Islamabad was not an option for Washington.²⁵ He further said:

Despite deep personal disappointments in the decisions of the Pakistani military and government, I still believe that we must stay engaged. This is because while Pakistan is the part of the problem in the region, it must also be part of the solution. A flawed and strained engagement with Pakistan is better than disengagement. We have completely disengaged in the past. That disengagement failed and brings us where we are today.²⁶

On November 26, 2011 US drone attacks killed 24 Pakistan soldiers’ posted at the Golden and Volcano border posts in Mohmand Agency. Pakistan maintains that the positions of the posts had been conveyed to the ISAF through map references. They could not be mistaken for terrorists’ sanctuaries because the other side has been providing all available information about the number of posts and their locations. The men at the posts were uniformed and the posts were well defined.²⁷ Why did the ISAF/NATO forces attack Pakistan's army posts in Mohmand Agency on November 26, 2011? Was it an intentional or unintentional attack? Aforesaid account indicates that it was an intentional act. This attack has not only tarnished the image of United States and ISAF/NATO forces but has also provoked Pakistan in general and its army in particular to react. In response to that Islamabad has stopped all supplies from Pakistan side to the US led NATO forces in Afghanistan and asked US to vacate Shamsi air base in Balochistan used for drone operation against terrorists inside Pakistan apart from boycotting the recently held Bonn Conference in Afghanistan on December 5th 2011. Besides this, the Pakistan army Chief General Kayani had given full liberty to retaliate against any further attacks without prior approval of the high command. This area was not the one from which the Haqqani group infiltrates into Afghanistan to attack the ISAF and Afghan forces. The NATO response has been of regret and has claimed its forces attacked in self-defence. They have promised to hold an inquiry.²⁸ The US regretted the aforesaid attack and stated that its military operations against Taliban led terrorists would continue despite Pakistan cutting of supplies to NATO/ISAF/US forces in Afghanistan.

However, the report of US investigation on Salala incident, conducted by the Brigadier General Stephen Clark was released on December 22, 2011 which contended that Pakistan's troops provoked a US response by opening the fire first that resulted into a series of mistakes by both ISAF and Pakistan's soldiers resulted into the deadly fight. Islamabad did not cooperate with the Pentagon inquiry. Pentagon's Brigadier-General Stephen Clark, however, made it clear that ‘US forces were fired on first and acted in self-defence’. Biggest flaw in the probe was that while it claimed that the US forces reacted in self-defence, it was not sure who really fired the first shot.²⁹ While responding to that Pakistan released a comprehensive report on January 23, 2012 that refuted the argument made in the Clark Report as follows:

The US/ISAF Investigation Report into November 26, 2011 incident apart from being factually incorrect, also brings to fore the larger issue of lack of trust of US/ISAF towards the Pakistani Military…The unprovoked engagement of Pakistan's Posts located inside Pakistan was a clear violation of US/ISAF mandate which is limited to Afghanistan alone; Pakistan was considered in an adversarial role and not part of friendly force. The current incident was preceded by four others…. First on June 10, 2008 at Goraprai Post located in Mohmand Agency, an unprovoked US/ISAF aerial strike killed 11 Pakistan's soldiers and injured seven others; Second on September 30, 2010, at Kharlachi Post in Kurram Agency, an unprovoked US aerial strike killed 3 soldiers and injured 3 others; Third on June 17, 2011, there was an incident at Ziarat Post in the same Mohmand Agency close to the area of November 26 attack; and fourth on July, 2011, an unprovoked US/ISAF motor and artillery fire in Angoor Adda Sector of South Waziristan Agency killed 4 Pakistan's soldiers; Despite promises of thorough investigation, US/ISAF failed to hold anyone accountable for each of these incidents; The US Investigation Report is structured around the argument of “self defence” and “proportional use of force”, an argument which is contrary to facts and therefore self serving…³⁰

Post Salala bitterness in Islamabad-Washington relations were accentuated due to the apparent delay and perhaps actual refusal of US apology on Salala attack, the discontinuity of NATO supply, the increasing cuts and sanctions on the US military aid and CSF dues for Pakistan, the drone strikes and etc. Pakistan- US relationship has always been based on short-term goals and could never develop into a lasting and durable partnership. Washington and Islamabad faced a dire need to successfully negotiate new terms of engagement by exploring and focusing on the new areas of concerns and objectives to convert their tactical partnership into a strategic and comprehensive one.³¹

Geo-strategy of US GWOT has remained Pakistan-centric because half of the NATO forces supplies run through routes in Pakistan apart from its collaboration in GWOT in Afghanistan. With the stoppage of supplies to the NATO forces in Afghanistan by the Pakistan, the earlier advantage of American geo-strategy has now become a limitation. The US has already explored the alternative route (Northern Network) of supply to its forces in Afghanistan. This alternative route may reduce the dependency of US on Pakistan for supply purposes but Pakistan is still a critical state in its overall strategy of GWOT. In response to the hostile attitude of Pakistan, the United States Congress proposed to push ahead with a proposal to freeze $700 million aid to Pakistan until Islamabad frames a strategy to fight the spread of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) in the region. This has further complicated the situation because Pakistan is one of the largest recipients of US foreign aid and the freeze, when it is empowered by the Congress, would form only a small portion of billions of dollars of civil and military assistance it gets each year. But the proposed freeze could lead to greater cut backs as demands rise in the US to penalize Islamabad for failing to act against militant groups on its soil, who kill US soldiers in Afghanistan.³²

In such a scenario what are the options available with both US and Pakistan because if the former needs latter not only to fight war on ground in Afghanistan but also to put in place a political dispensation in Kabul which can ensure peace and stability in war-torn country after the ISAF/NATO/US withdrawal. Understandably, Afghanistan cannot get stability without constructive support from Pakistan. However, an unstable Afghanistan would not be an asset for Pakistan as- it would be having serious implication for its internal security. The more Afghanistan remains unstable, the more Pakistan is likely to feel the pangs of it. Half of the ills that Pakistan has been facing today started with instability in Afghanistan in 1980s.³³ Now anti-Americanism is at peak in Pakistan but can Pakistan afford to annoy US at this moment because it is getting huge amount of economic aid from US apart from the military aid. However, Islamabad has been looking towards China but Beijing would not be able to replace the American largesse-more than $3 billion annually to Pakistan. Pakistan needs American aid badly, partly to fight extremists, partly to rescue its economy from the devastation triggered by 2010 summer floods and from mis-governance, which has failed to deliver essential to ordinary people.³⁴ Besides this, Islamabad has been facing difficulty in repaying its international debts because of its bad economic situation. Making life more difficult for Americans and NATO forces in Afghanistan can cost Pakistan not only aid from the US but also from the international institutions like International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). Americans are already frustrated because the aid provided to Pakistan during the last one decade has not achieved its counter-terrorism objectives. People of Pakistan are also unhappy because this aid has failed to revive economy and to build democracy. Since military aid has been two or three times as large as economic aid, the US government has strengthened the hand of the military in Pakistan's political economy, sidestepping the elected civilian government because there has been more trust, unfounded, no doubt, in the ability of Pakistani military.³⁵ Why was Pakistan's army unhappy with the United States? Pakistan army was unhappy with the United States because of these reasons. First, increasing intensity of drone strikes has further tarnished the already declining credibility of army in Pakistani society. Second, the US was more interested in providing non-military instead of military aid to Pakistan. It has already increased the quantity of non-military aid as compared to military aid. Third, the $ 3 billion US aid to Pakistan for the year 2011 was blocked by the American Congress. Fourth, because the US has openly started accusing ISI, the right hand of Pakistan army for its close proximity with the HN, which the US has recently narrowed down its major enemy in Afghanistan after the decline of Al Qaeda.

With its economy on drip, Islamabad needs US aid as much as the US needs Pakistan's cooperation to sustain an effective presence in Afghanistan. Therefore, the stand-off was likely to be followed by a rapprochement, continuing US aid and more elbow room for Pakistan to position itself as top-dog in Afghanistan when US-ISAF military pull out in 2014.³⁶ Inevitability of getting back together is probably why Pakistan's initial steps to articulate anger were developments that the US/NATO/ISAF can live with. Closure of supply lines to Afghanistan does not immediately impact the coalition forces as they had built alternate routes in anticipation of such a stand-off and US according to general understanding, had stopped using the Shamsi airbase for launching drone strikes sometime back.³⁷ Dilemma of Washington has been to whom to deal with in Pakistan-the army or civilian political dispensation. When the third alliance partnership was formalized (2001), there was unity of command in Pakistan because at that time Pakistan state was headed by the praetorian regime led by General Musharraf but subsequently Pakistan was headed by the civilian government led by Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani now Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif but the army under the command of General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani was having all the powers at its disposal. Military leadership was not happy with US drone strikes in Pakistan's territory because it did not only violate its sovereignty but it has reflections on army's credibility. That is why the General Kayani refused to take action against the HN despite the US counseling in this regard. It appears that the civilian political leadership does not have any problem in taking action against HN provided civilian political dispensation's survival was ensured. The classic case in point was alleged memo sent by President Zardari to Admiral Mike Mullen's office in which Washington's help was sought in pre-empting a military take over following the American raid in Abbottabad to take out Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden.³⁸ In the memo, Zardari was alleged to have made some offers to the US in return for putting pressure on the military establishment and the ISI to prevent them from dislodging the democratically elected government. The offer include an independent inquiry into allegations of Pakistan harbouring Osama bin Laden, fixing responsibility for it, replacing the national security structure with trusted advisers with historical links to the US and elimination Section S of the ISI, which was charged with maintaining relations with the Taliban and HN.³⁹ Although, the dual purpose of the memo sent by the civilian political dispensation to the US was to ward off the threat of military coup at home and to help the US in more effective way in its GWOT after the killing of Osama bin Laden. But this memogate affair has proved to be counterproductive for then President Zardari because it has not only strained its relations with the army but also with Washington. The army Chief General Ashfaque Parvez Kayani had felt upset after the memogate issue in which Presdient Zardari's name figured prominently. They began to suspect each other more than before as it amounts to breach of trust between the two.

Was Third Alliance Partnership Unique?

During the initial years of US-Pakistan third alliance partnership, the US being dominant player has also benefited immensely. First of all, the US got on board, Pakistan as a frontline state in its war on terror and thereby it succeeded to overthrow the Taliban regime in Kabul. This helped the United States and its coalition forces to concentrate on the target of GWOT that was to kill Osama bin Laden and to eliminate Al Qaeda from the Af-Pak region. Pakistan's collaboration with US had paid dividends to the latter in its GWOT. Washington has succeeded to kill large number of Al Qaeda operatives with the help of intelligence input and support on the ground provided by Islamabad to US/ISAF/NATO forces.

Notwithstanding the gains of this collaboration between the patron (US) and client (Pakistan), the developments took place in the year 2011, indicated that their third alliance partnership has suffered from various setbacks.

First and second alliance partnership of Washington with Islamabad were formalized during the cold war period with an objective of contain Soviet influence in this part of the world, whereas the third partnership formalized after 9/11 happenings with an objective to fight GWOT. In the second partnership, the Washington along with Islamabad used terrorism as an instrument of its policy to serve its interest in Afghanistan. Afghan Mujahedeens were used as an instrument to achieve their objectives against Soviets in Afghanistan. Whereas in third alliance partnership, the US has been fighting against the terror again with the help of Pakistan in which the latter initially collaborated but later starting backtracking while refusing to take action against the HN. During first and second alliance partnerships, the Washington was not physically involved in the operations on ground, whereas, during third partnership, the US has been fighting GWOT in collaboration with Pakistan in Af-Pak region. It has volunteered 1,00,000 troops and thereby it was having firsthand experience of what has been happening in Af-Pak theatre. Further, in first and second alliance partnerships, Pakistan was not considered as part of problem but in third partnership, Pakistan has been treated as a part of problem. During the course of the evolution of first and second alliance partnerships, Pakistan was at liberty to join or not but that liberty was not available to Islamabad when the third alliance partnership was entered into. Pakistan was coerced to join US war on terror against Al Qaeda and Taliban. Musharraf admitted in his book that Pakistan was coerced into an alliance partnership. Four similarities have been noticed amongst all the three partnership. First, at the end of first and second alliance partnership, the initiatives whether to continue or break the same was with the Washington and the same has been true with the third alliance partnership. Whether Islamabad would be able to withstand the pressure of fallouts of the break of third alliance partnership with the Washington is a critical question to be explored. Second, they were driven by the US that happened to be a dominant player by providing military and economic aid. Third, these three alliance partnerships have further consolidated the anti- American sentiment in the society of Pakistan. Due to three tactical alliance partnerships, no credible basis of friendship has developed between Islamabad and Washington; rather it has strengthened the anti-American sentiment in Pakistan. Anti-Americanism means feelings of disapproval, hostility, or condemnation that are found among Pakistan's people against the American government and its policies. No significant evidence of feeling against the American people, as opposed to their government, was found, although the distinction was sometimes difficult to make.⁴⁰ Fourth, the fundamental problem undergirding the third US-Pakistan alliance partnership like the first and second alliance partnerships has been centred along security interest i. e. the war against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, instead of being a broad partnership ranging from trade to cultural linkages. General Karamat, Pakistan's former army chief and ambassador to the US argued that the “US-Pakistan relations were at their worst because the relations between the Pentagon and Pakistan army were unstable”.⁴¹ Absence of broad partnership between America and Pakistan prevented the building of mutual trust or the alignment of interests. Instead, the two countries settled for a one-dimensional, transactional relationship centred along security concerns. What was missing was a synchronicity between the two countries’ security calculus for the Af-Pak region.⁴²

A report presented in April 2013 by Congressional Research Service for the US Congress to Congress reveals that Pakistan received a total of $ 25.91 billion from the US in terms of military and economic aid since September 2001. The US had budgeted approximately $ 17.22 billion in military and $ 8.68 billion in economic assistance to Pakistan during the period; thus making it the largest source of bilateral aid to Pakistan, says the report.⁴³ While articulating, the US frustration regarding Pakistan, Ted Poe, US Congressman 2nd District of Texas stated:

Pakistan is a disloyal, deceptive and devious ally of the United States. Pakistan harbours Taliban terrorists that are at war with our troops in Afghanistan. Pakistan hid out Osama bin Laden. Pakistan put the doctor that helped the United States to take out “the devil of the desert” in prison for 30 years. Pakistan is playing the US for a nation of fools. Otherwise why our government just send $ 1.2 billion to Pakistan? Haven't we learned that takes our money and slyly and seditiously uses it for purposes counter to US interests? Pakistan has become the Benedict Arnold ally of America. Why do we pay Pakistan to hate us? They will do it for free. No American tax payer money to Pakistan. Use that American money in America. Freedom loving nations that give Pakistan money in the delusive hope of fighting terrorism are sailing the ships of the foolish—and the United States has become the admiral of the fleet.⁴⁴

Notwithstanding that Washington needs Islamabad's support to achieve a favourable regional environment for an eventual settlement in Afghanistan. The US Defence Secretary Panetta observed that “ultimately, we can't win the war in Afghanistan without being able to win in our relationship with Pakistan as well”.⁴⁵ At the same time, US-Pakistan ties are much better at the private and official level than portrayed in public. Their militaries and intelligence services collaborate in many important areas. Still, the United States can at best address only some of Pakistan's problems. The US officials need to consider what goals are most important and how to achieve them.⁴⁶ The objective of US in Afghanistan is to reach at a negotiated settlement that allows it to withdraw most of its forces, leaving a few thousand behind to protect the regime in Kabul and carry out limited counterterrorism operations against Al-Qaeda and other groups that threaten the government or US interests.⁴⁷ In a joint statement released by the White House on October 23, 2013, following President Obama and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif meeting in US, it was stated “the two leaders emphasised that no country's territory should be used to destabilize its neighbours”.⁴⁸ On October 15, 2015, Obama Administration decided not to remove all troops from Afghanistan because Washington does not want concede the ground to Taliban, HN and Al Qaeda, it gained during the course of the fifteen years long GWOT.

However, Washington has substantially reduced the presence of its troops from 100000 in 2010 to 5000 at the end of 2015. Main reason to retain its military presence in Afghanistan, Obama Administration believes that the US withdrawal from Iraq allowed the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) but it do not want ISIS to emerge as serious threat to the Af-Pak region. If the Washington completely leaves Kabul, the Taliban and the ISIS will emerge as a force to reckon with in Afghanistan. Obama does not want to preside over that fiasco, it is far better to settle in far an endless war than have to declare defeat.⁴⁹ The peripheral reason to retain its military presence in Afghanistan is to train Afghan National Army (ANA). However, the long term interest of Pakistan demands that Islamabad should come out of the duality on GWOT and fight effectively against terror in collaboration Washington in the Af-Pak region.

Conclusion

To sum-up, it can be argued that all the three alliance partnerships that Pakistan has experienced with the United States so far, have not only given it the status of most allied ally to Pakistan but they have also reduced its status to client state. These alliance partnerships were based on the asymmetrical relationship between the dominant and dominated players. The US has always remained the dominant player and Pakistan the dominated player. They could not comprehend their relationship beyond the security driven tactical partnership for the limited period and that too for obtaining a specific objective. Average Pakistani feels that Pakistan has incurred a huge political, economic and social price while collaborating with the US in GWOT without gaining anything substantial in return except economic and military aid. Its economy was in bad shape and its society has radicalized and political violence has become the part and parcel of political life. However, the recent developments in their bilateral relations are not very encouraging for sustaining the third alliance partnership but it appears that it will be driven by the compulsions of both the partners rather than their broad understanding. Washington had clearly indicated that it was not happy with this partnership but it does not want to disengage Pakistan, keeping in view its long term interests in Af-Pak region and its past experience of disengaging Pakistan had already proved counterproductive. Third alliance partnership was started with the convergence of immediate interests between the two partners but latter it has landed in a difficult situation wherein the divergence of their interests has surfaced tremendously. While stopping the supply route to NATO troops through its territory, getting the Shamsi air base vacated, by boycotting Bonn Conference on the future of Afghanistan, giving liberty to its army to retaliate any further drone attack on its territory by the ISAF/NATO/US forces, Islamabad has tried to build pressure on Washington to serve its (Pakistan's) interest in Afghanistan. Pakistan in general and its army in particular knows it very well that Afghanistan is its trump card because US and international community cannot ensure stability in Afghanistan without the help of Pakistan. But doing so Islamabad is committing mistake because in the short run, such a position can make the life difficult for NATO and US forces in Afghanistan but in the long run the perennial instability in Afghanistan would continue to be a security threat for Pakistan. Islamabad needs to come out of the mould of zero-sum-game to improve its relations with its mentor on the issue of GWOT in the Af-Pak region. Peace and stability in Afghanistan would be a win-win situation not only for Washington and Islamabad but also for the people of Afghanistan and the entire Af-Pak, South Asian and Central Asian regions.

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